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 After a jury-waived trial in the Central Division of the 
Boston Municipal Court Department, the trial judge convicted the 
defendant, David M. Agro, under G. L. c. 209A, § 7, of one count 
of violating an abuse prevention order.  On appeal, Agro argues 
that the trial judge abused her discretion by admitting the 
Commonwealth's key evidence -- specifically, a screenshot that 
the victim took of her Facebook "Notifications" page.  The 
screenshot shows that a Facebook user named Monte Agro "liked" a 
post to the victim written by a third party.  The third party's 
post stated "Happy Birthday [victim]." The Commonwealth's theory 
was that the defendant violated the restraining order's no 
contact prohibition because by "liking" the third party's post, 
the defendant's "like" was communicated to the victim in 
accordance with Facebook's processes.  Agro contends that the 
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image of the Facebook "like" was not properly authenticated and 
thus inadmissible.  We disagree and affirm.   
 Background.  Agro and the victim met in 2002 and were 
married in 2009; they separated in 2014.  In May of 2015, a 
Probate and Family Court judge issued a c. 209A abuse prevention 
order against Agro after Agro had published a Facebook post, on 
the victim's birthday, containing lurid and thinly veiled 
threats of violence against the victim.  Approximately one year 
later and six days before the expiration of the 209A order, the 
victim looked at her Facebook notifications page on her cell 
phone and saw that Facebook user Monte Agro had "liked" a 
birthday message to the victim posted one day earlier, on the 
victim's birthday.  The "like" was communicated on the victim's 
"Notifications" page as follows:  "Monte Agro likes a post on 
your timeline."1  The victim took a screenshot of the page and 
                     
1 The victim testified that the Facebook timeline is a Facebook 
interface that shows a record of "posts" -- for example, "people 
. . . post messages to you related to an event that's maybe 
marked by Facebook," such as a birthday.  With respect to 
"liking," the victim stated: 
 
 "[W]hen someone sends a message to me and it . . . 
 say[s] . . . happy birthday, if people want to  
 reinforce or send the same message . . . instead of  
 kind of taking the time to, like, type it out again, 
 like is a way to say . . . I'm sending you the same 
 message.  It's kind of a lazy man's way of reinforcing 
 something." 
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provided the image to the Boston Police Department.2  The 
defendant was charged and thereafter convicted of violating the 
abuse prevention order.  The defendant appeals.   
 Discussion.  The sole issue that Agro raises on appeal is 
whether the Commonwealth sufficiently demonstrated that Agro was 
actually responsible for the "like."3  The relevance and 
admissibility of the Facebook screenshot of the "like" depended 
upon the defendant having authored it.  See Commonwealth v. 
Meola, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 303, 308 (2019).  Both the Supreme 
Judicial Court and this court have recently addressed the issue 
of authentication of electronic communications.  See 
Commonwealth v. Purdy, 459 Mass. 442, 450-451 (2011); Meola, 95 
Mass. App. Ct. at 310-315.  "The requirement of authentication 
. . . as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by 
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in 
question is what its proponent claims."  Purdy, 459 Mass. at 
447, quoting Mass. G. Evid. § 901(a) (2011).  The trial judge, 
                     
2 Although the parties have not included a copy of the abuse 
prevention order in the appendix, the victim read relevant 
portions of the order into the record.  Among other things, the 
order prohibited Agro from "contact[ing]" the victim "in person, 
by telephone, in writing, electronically, or otherwise either 
directly or through someone else."   
 
3 We note that Agro does not contend that in the circumstances 
the "liking" of a Facebook post made by a third party cannot 
constitute a violation of the no contact provisions.   
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acting as gatekeeper, determines whether the fact finder could 
find by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered 
evidence is what its proponent says it is.  See Purdy, 459 Mass. 
at 447; Meola, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 307 (explaining further that 
authentication "represents a special aspect of relevancy" 
[citation omitted]).  At trial, the defendant preserved his 
objection to the screenshot's admissibility.  We review the 
judge's authentication determination for abuse of discretion.  
See Meola, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 312; Commonwealth v. Connolly, 
91 Mass. App. Ct. 580, 585 (2017).   
 In this case the Commonwealth did not present direct 
evidence that the defendant authored the "like."  Nor did anyone 
from Facebook testify as to what its business records showed 
regarding the "Monte Agro" account.  "Evidence that the 
defendant's name is written as the author of an . . . electronic 
communication . . . is not sufficient alone to authenticate the 
electronic communication as having been authored or sent by the 
defendant."  Purdy, 459 Mass. at 450.  Purdy and Meola make 
clear, however, that direct evidence is not required, and that 
an electronic communication can be authenticated through 
circumstantial evidence -- so-called "confirming circumstances" 
-- that tend to show authorship by a particular person.  See 
Purdy, 459 Mass. at 450; Meola, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 311.  
Circumstantial authenticating evidence "may include the 
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'appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other 
distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all 
the circumstances'" (emphasis added).  Meola, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 311 n.20, quoting Mass. G. Evid. § 901(b)(4) (2019).   
 Here, the victim's testimony based upon her lengthy 
relationship with Agro furnished sufficient circumstantial 
evidence for the judge to make the preliminary finding that the 
Commonwealth had authenticated the Facebook "like," and thus to 
admit the screenshot displaying it.  The victim had known Agro 
for sixteen years, and had lived with and been married to him.  
She testified that over the years she had communicated with Agro 
on Facebook through the user account "Mont[e] Agro."  To the 
victim's knowledge, Agro did not give the victim or anyone else 
the password to his Facebook account, or enable others to access 
the account.   
 This history of communication was sufficient to support a 
determination of authenticity.  Just as past patterns of 
telephone conversations may suffice to authenticate the identity 
of a caller, see Purdy, 459 Mass. at 449, so too may the details 
and history of communication with a certain Facebook user 
suffice to authenticate a Facebook post as emanating from that 
user.  Moreover, here there were additional, and more specific, 
"confirming circumstances"; the event that led to the 209A order 
was itself a Facebook post directed at the victim, which post 
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came from "Monte Agro," on the victim's birthday, one year 
before.  These circumstances supported a reasonable inference 
that Agro was also the author of the 2016 birthday "like" 
emanating from the same account.  The victim had received no 
contact whatsoever from Agro since the prior, threatening 
birthday post.  See Commonwealth v. Loach, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 
313, 316 (1999) (reasoning that timing of phone call was 
confirming circumstance that supported authentication of phone 
call).  In light of the context supplied by the victim's 
testimony, as well as our deferential review of authentication 
determinations, the judge did not err in admitting or relying 
upon the Facebook "like."4   
 The prior course of dealing on Facebook between Agro and 
the victim falls squarely within the broad range of confirming 
circumstances that the judge may consider.  Agro attempts to 
distinguish this case from Purdy, 459 Mass. 442, on the grounds 
that the types of circumstantial evidence present there are 
absent here.  In Purdy, which concerned the authentication of e-
mails, the circumstantial evidence supporting authentication 
                     
4 We note, as have prior courts, that the admission of the 
screenshot displaying the "like" did not preclude Agro from 
challenging the significance of the "like" or offering 
alternative interpretations of its meaning.  See Meola, 95 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 313, citing United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125, 
131 (2d Cir. 2014).  Such arguments speak to the weight of the 
evidence, not to its admissibility.  Id.   
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included the presence of the e-mails on the hard drive of the 
defendant's computer (to which the defendant supplied the 
necessary passwords), as well as the content of the e-mails 
themselves.  Id. at 450-451.  But while the confirming 
circumstances in this case are different from those in Purdy, 
Purdy's holding does not limit the circumstantial evidence 
courts may consider to the type present in that case.  See id.; 
Meola, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 313.  Indeed, in applying Purdy, the 
Meola court relied upon different factors as sufficient to 
authenticate a Facebook message with an attached video 
recording.  95 Mass. App. Ct. at 314.  Here, the judge's 
decision is consistent with Purdy and Meola; she relied upon 
considerably more than "pure speculation," as Agro asserts, in 
deciding to admit the screenshot.   
Judgment affirmed. 
By the Court (Rubin, 
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